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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Brad Hjelm appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Mr. Hjelm pleaded guilty and the district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, and the court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Hjelm on
probation. Mr. Hjelm now appeals, and he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a continuance and his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 6, 2015, a Madison County Sheriff’s Deputy ran a license plate check on a
vehicle that was travelling on Highway 20. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI,)
p.3.) This vehicle was registered to John Jensen, who did not have a valid driver’s license. (PSI,
p.3.) The Deputy stopped the vehicle; Mr. Jensen stated that he was aware that his driver’s
license had expired, and he indicated that his passenger, Mr. Hjelm, had a valid license and could
drive. (PSI, p.3.)
The officer stated that he could smell marijuana in the vehicle. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Jensen
was informed that his vehicle was going to be searched due to the “probable cause to search his
vehicle due to the odor” of marijuana. (PSI, p.4.) The search of the vehicle produced suspected
methamphetamine under the passenger seat and a glass pipe with residue on it. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Hjelm was arrested and searched; methamphetamine and a marijuana pipe were found on
him. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Hjelm was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.42.) He filed a
motion to suppress, asserting that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated because
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his seizure was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and because he was not
provided Miranda1 rights prior to being arrested and questioned. (R., p.50.) However, at the
hearing that was scheduled on the motion, Mr. Hjelm pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance. (R., p.58.)
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Hjelm moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that his plea was
made involuntarily and without being properly advised of the facts of the case. (R., p.60.) At
the hearing scheduled for sentencing, the district court granted Mr. Hjelm’s motion to withdraw
his plea. (R., p.64.)
Subsequently, and after retaining new counsel, Mr. Hjelm filed a motion supplementing
his previously-filed motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss. (R., p.90.) The district court
denied the motion to suppress with regard to the Fourth Amendment but did suppress
Mr. Hjelm’s statements while in custody prior to receiving Miranda warnings. (R., p.133.) The
case was then set for trial. (R., p.134.)
On the morning of trial, the parties entered a plea agreement in which Mr. Hjelm agreed
to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance and the State agreed not to oppose a
withheld judgment and not to ask for more than 30 days of jail time. (R., p.137.) Then, five
days prior to sentencing, Mr. Hjelm, acting pro se, filed a Motion to Execute Stay Of
Proceedings and Abate Further Proceedings, a Motion to Withdraw Attorney of Record, and a
Motion for Continuance. (R., pp.140-146.) At the hearing scheduled for sentencing, the district
court continued the sentencing hearing and denied Mr. Hjelm’s other motion without prejudice
so as to allow Mr. Hjelm to hire new counsel who could bring up the matter. (R., p.148.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Mr. Hjelm, still acting pro se, then filed a Motion to Change Venue Due to Violation of
Civil Rights and A Fair Hearing. (R., p.149.) He then filed a Petition for Rehearing on his prior
motions and a Petition for All Discovery. (R., p.151.) At the next hearing, Mr. Hjelm informed
the court that he would like appointed counsel and the district court appointed the public
defender. (R., pp.157-158.)
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Hjelm requested a continuance,
which was denied. (R., p.160.) Counsel then framed Mr. Hjelm’s pro se motions as a motion to
withdraw his plea, and argued that the court should grant the motion. (R., p.160.) The district
court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. (R., p.160.) The court imposed a sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, and the court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Hjelm on
probation for a period of five years. (R., p.163.) Mr. Hjelm appealed. (R., p.171.) He asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance and to
withdraw his guilty plea.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hjelm’s motion to continue the
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hjelm’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Hjelm’s Motion For A Continuance
The granting of a motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the action of that court will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of
discretion.

State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 448 (1973).

Ordinarily, a denial of

a motion for continuance is not an abuse of discretion absent a showing that substantial rights of
the defendant have been prejudiced. State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200 (1971). When determining
whether a court has abused its discretion, this Court considers: (1) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether
the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, ___,
398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017).
At the hearing on Mr. Hjelm’s pro se filings, counsel for Mr. Hjelm characterized the
filings as a motion to withdraw the plea. (Tr., p.158, Ls.1-3.) Counsel for Mr. Hjelm requested a
continuance to further discuss the case with Mr. Hjelm, and specifically, because Mr. Hjelm did
not feel like he was able to receive all of the discovery requested in the case. (Tr., p.160, Ls.1120.) Specifically, counsel requested additional time to request “dispatch calls, dispatch logs, and
911 records. We’d like to have that audio.” (Tr., p.160, Ls.10-20.) When asked why this
information would be pertinent, counsel responded,
Your Honor, my client was trespassed from some property he was fishing on.
He fished on the property twice. A week prior to the day of his arrest, he fished
on that property. And the property owner came and discussed the situation with
him; found out that the person he was with, John, owned part of the property;
and allowed him to fish. Apparently, they were fishing there a week later, the
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day of the arrest, and the cops earlier in the day came and trespassed him from
the property.
Later in the day they were pulled over and arrested, and my client feels that the
stop wasn’t namely due to the fact that there was an invalid license but namely
due to the fact that there was a relationship between the landowner and the cops
or as a result of the cops pulling over – trespassing him earlier in the day and
then letting another department know what was going on.
(Tr., p.161, L.23 – p.161, L.13.) The court then inquired as to why this would impact the case,
considering that the officer testified at the suppression hearing that the vehicle was stopped due
to the fact that he recognized the driver to be someone that was driving without a license.
(Tr., p.161, Ls.14-22.) Counsel responded that, if the dispatch information showed that there
was a different reason that the vehicle was stopped, Mr. Hjelm would be able to impeach the
officer’s testimony. (Tr., p.162, Ls.1-6.) Further, counsel acknowledged the State’s and the
district court’s concerns that the case had been delayed several times before, but, “if there is not
a scintilla of evidence or if these dispatch records are not dispositive of anything, then let us
review them. It’s going to take a small amount of time. Mr. Hjelm has already made a request
of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office independently to try to get those dispatch records. He
hasn’t gotten them. We’ve tried to get them.” (Tr., p.173, Ls.17-22.)
When the court inquired as to why this issue had not been brought up previously,
specifically at the suppression hearing, counsel stated, “my client informs me that he brought it
up with his first public defender, Mr. Garner. He brought it up with his second attorney,
Mr. Bunitsky, and it was never addressed. The records were never requested.” (Tr., p.174,
Ls.21-24.)
The district court denied the motion for a continuance, holding,
The Court notes that back on July 20, 2016, that there was a suppression hearing,
that Officer Brodie Rising testified. He was under oath. Mr. Hjelm was present
with his attorney, Mr. Butinsky, had a full opportunity to cross-examine the
officer about these issues. The evidence that was supplied to the Court at that
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hearing, which was not opposed by any testimony offered by Mr. Hjelm, so the
unopposed testimony from the officer was that he had identified and recognized
the driver of the vehicle and he understood that the driver of the vehicle shouldn’t
have been driving because he didn’t have a driver’s license.
So regardless of whether or not there may have been some ulterior motive, he was
able to articulate reasonable suspicion without anything contrary being supplied
by the Defense. Certainly they had full opportunity at that time to cross-examine
him about motives and intents and – if somehow that was even relevant to his
credibility, as it turned out, the driver of the vehicle, as the Court understands,
didn’t have a license and was on probation at the time.
So I just don’t think this is an argument that has any merit and would certainly
justify a continuance.
(Tr., p.177, Ls.4-25.)
Mr. Hjelm respectfully submits that the district court abused its discretion by denying the
motion for a continuance because the court did not reach its decision through an exercise of
reason. As an initial matter, Mr. Hjelm agrees with the district court that whether the arresting
officer had an ulterior motive for conducting the stop is irrelevant, for the purposes of
suppressing, where the officer does have reasonable, articulable suspicion. But in this case,
counsel was asking for a continuance on a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and the argument
was not that presenting evidence of an ulterior motive would have changed the outcome of the
suppression hearing, it was that it could be used to impeach the officer’s credibility generally;
this could be done at trial and would be good cause for Mr. Hjelm to withdraw his plea. The
arresting officer’s credibility would certainly be relevant at trial. Thus, regardless of whether the
information in the dispatch records would impact the result of the suppression motion, it could
possibly have given Mr. Hjelm the ability to impeach the officer’s credibility at trial and good
cause to withdraw his plea. Thus, Mr. Hjelm submits that the district court failed to reach its
decision through an exercise of reason and abused its discretion by denying the motion for a
continuance.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Hjelm’s Motion To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea
When a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, the Court will
first determine whether the defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. State v.
Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).

“Where a guilty plea is shown to be constitutionally

invalid . . . leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated.” State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho
428, 432 (Ct. App. 1994). If the court determines that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, it must ask whether the defendant provided a “just reason” to withdraw the plea.
State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). If the defendant shows there is a just reason to
withdraw the plea, the district court should grant the motion “absent a strong showing of
prejudice by the state.” State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411 (Ct. App. 1991). “The district
court is empowered with broad discretion, liberal exercise of which is encouraged.” State v.
Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 414 (Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). “[E]ven when the motion is
presented before sentencing, if it occurs after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI
or has received other information about the probable sentence, the district court may temper its
liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive.” Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222.
After the motion for a continuance was denied, counsel next addressed Mr. Hjelm’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel stated that, on the morning when this case was
originally set to go to trial, the prosecutor informed Mr. Hjelm and his attorney that if Mr. Hjelm
was convicted, he would recommend two years in prison and this “scared” Mr. Hjelm.
(Tr., p.179, Ls.11-18.) Mr. Hjelm then made a decision to plead guilty based on the fact that the
prosecutor would recommend 30 days as opposed to two years in prison. (Tr., p.179, Ls.15-18.)
Counsel emphasized that he did not think the prosecutor did anything wrong and was not
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accusing him of misconduct, but that “the effect of what it was on my client is that he made a
decision that he didn’t want to make.”

(Tr., p.179, Ls.19-25.)

Counsel emphasized that

Mr. Hjelm was fully prepared to go to trial and that prosecutor’s statements “shook him and
rattled him enough that he didn’t want to go to trial anymore.” (Tr., p.180, Ls.1-5.) Further,
Mr. Hjelm asserted that he did not have enough time to discuss his options with his attorney; the
record shows that the change of plea hearing took place at 9:31 a.m. and trial was set to
commence at 9:00 a.m., so he had about a half hour. (Tr., p.181, Ls.3-13.)
Counsel emphasized that this was not a case of “buyer’s remorse” where a defendant
reviews a PSI and begins to worry about his sentence; in this case the PSI recommended
probation and counsel believed that the sentence recommended by the prosecutor was proper.
(Tr., p.180, Ls.17-25.) Further, counsel informed the court that Mr. Hjelm disagreed with the
district court’s ruling on the suppression motion but did not have the ability to appeal that
decision due to the plea agreement, and did not think that Mr. Hjelm had been advised to that
effect; counsel believed that having a conditional plea could have resolved a lot of the issues.
(Tr., p.182, Ls.1-8.) Finally, counsel reasserted the issue with regard to the dispatch records and
911 calls previously discussed during the motion for a continuance argument.
The district court denied the motion, holding that, based on the entry of plea hearing,
Mr. Hjelm made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to plead guilty. (Tr., p.190,
Ls.10-16.) The court concluded that there had no reason presented to withdraw the plea and
concluded that, Mr. Helm “just, after the fact, gets scared and changes his mind.” (Tr., p.191,
Ls.2-10.)
Counsel for Mr. Hjelm on appeal acknowledges that trial counsel specifically conceded
that the prosecutor had not committed misconduct in his discussions with Mr. Hjelm. Mindful of
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this, Mr. Hjelm asserts that he was intimidated by the threat of prison time and only pleaded
guilty to avoid prison time. Further, as was argued by trial counsel at the motion for a
continuance, Mr. Hjelm did not have the opportunity to fully review the dispatch information and
he believed that there was information from dispatch that he could have used to impeach Officer
Rising had his case gone to trial. Considering these circumstances, Mr. Hjelm respectfully
submits that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision through an
exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hjelm requests that the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea be
reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that the
order denying his motion for a continuance be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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